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I.  
 
In 17th and 18th century philosophical discourse, “Enthusiasm” signifies an 
especially menacing political threat. At that time, the followers of religious mass 
movements were called “enthusiasts.” In his Letter Concerning Enthusiasm (1708), 
Shaftesbury explains its danger. For Shaftesbury, enthusiasm is contagious. 
Progressing from one person to the next, there is soon an uncontrollable mob: 
 
“WE may with good reason call every Passion Pannick which is rais’d in a 
Multitude, and convey’d by Aspect, or as it were by Contact or Sympathy. 
Thus popular Fury may be call’d Pannick, when the Rage of the People, as 
we have sometimes known, has put them beyond themselves; especially 
where Religion has to do. And in this state their very Looks are infectious. 
The Fury flies from Face to Face: and the Disease is no sooner seen than 
caught.” 
 
An analogy for society is thus the human body, and the exaltation of masses is 
nothing more than social fever. Every fear in human history can be linked to 
fanaticism – “Bloodshed, Wars, Persecutions and Devastations” – may be 
understood as a pathology of the community, as an infection of the “Body-politick”. 
Even this short description informs us of the strong relation between Shaftesbury 
and the Platonian characterization of enthusiasm in his dialogue Ion. Shaftesbury 
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and Plato agree about the essence of enthusiasm, especially in two main points: 
first, that the exaltation of the enthusiasts brings them “beyond-themselves”, and 
second, the astounding speed with which exaltation reproduces itself. The 
difference between Shaftesbury and Plato lies in their evaluation of the 
phenomenon. Plato characterizes enthusiasm as a “divine madness” – a mania 
inspired by a god or a poet –, whereas Shaftesbury foregrounds its dangerous role 
as a political threat.  
 What cure may heal this fever? Shaftesbury rejects any form of repression 
or violence, because they might further inflame the fury of the enthusiasts. In the 
Polis of the antiquity, Shaftesbury writes, only the acuteness of wit and the 
mockery could supress the spread of enthusiasm: “Whilst some Sects, such as the 
Pythagorean and latter Platonick, join’d in with the Superstition and Enthusiasm of 
the Times; the Epicurean, the Academick, and others, were allow’d to use all the 
Force of Wit and Raillery against it. And thus matters were happily ballanc’d.” 
 For Shaftesbury, “Wit” and “Raillery” are the only powerful means against 
fanaticism. In his demand for “good homour”, Shaftesbury employs all possible 
meanings of ‘humour’ in early 18th-century English: body liquids, ‘fancy’, ‘mood’, 
‘state of mind’, ‘wit’, ‘humor’ (in the modern sense). But good humour alone 
could not succeed against enthusiasm, if enthusiasm itself did not have the 
potential of being ridiculous. Enthusiasm, as a visible activity, initially seems 
absurd: “For the Bodys of the Prophets, in their State of Prophecy, being not in 
their own power, but (as they say themselves) mere passive Organs, actuated by an 
exterior Force, have nothing natural, or resembling real Life, in any of their 
Sounds or Motions: so that how aukardly soever a Puppet-Show may imitate 
other Actions, it must needs represent this Passion to the Life.” In the act of 
receiving his prophecies, the body of the prophet does not only resemble a lifeless 
doll; he actually transforms himself into a puppet manipulated by god.  
 Enthusiasm can thus be forged: one can quite easily simulate the 
enthusiastic rapture either out of self-deception or in order to mock those who 
believe it. There is a ‘real’ and a ‘false’ enthusiasm, the false being this fictionalized 
or phony version. This distinction is not easy to make. The proximity of the 
enthusiast to God, the “being-in-God” (which literally means “enthusiasm”), 
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could also be produced by a phantom, a chimera of god, a merely imagined god. For 
Shaftesbury, enthusiasm comes under the suspicion of deception and 
dissimulation. Shaftesbury refers to the tradition of the call of the muses as an 
example for a clearly imitable and imitated enthusiasm: “IT has been an establish’d 
Custom for Poets, at the entrance of their Work, to adress themselves to some 
Muse: and this Practice of the Antients has gain’d so much Repute, that even in 
our days we find it almost constantly imitated.” 
 Enthusiasm has been, since its inception, accompanied by its imitation. It 
is the task of the critical philosopher to distinguish between these ‘true’ and ‘false’ 
enthusiasms. Every enthusiastic exaltation feels like a rapture induced by God 
himself. But what if it is merely a phantom or a product of the imagination 
encouraging this state of enthusiasm? Since the possibility of self-deception is 
inherent to the structure of enthusiasm, the subjective experience of the enthusiast 
cannot be relied on to accurately determine if it is ‘real’. The enthusiast Theokles in 
Shaftesbury’s novel The Moralists (1709) seems to be confused about the nature 
and source of his own raptures: “Now, PHILOCLES, said he, (starting as out of a 
Dream) how has it been with me in my Fit? Seem’d it a sensible kind of Madness, 
like those Transports which are permitted to our Poets? or was it downright Ra-
ving?” 
 Following the difference between ‘real’ and ‘false’ enthusiasm – or between 
“a sensible kind of Madness” and “downright Raving” –, Shaftesbury 
distinguishes between good “Inspiration” and dangerous “Enthusiasm”. “THE only 
thing, my Lord”, Shaftesbury writes,  
 
“I wou’d infer from all this, is, that ENTHUSIASM is wonderfully powerful 
and extensive; that it is a matter of nice Judgment, and the hardest thing in 
the world to know fully and distinctly; since even Atheism is not exempt 
from it. [...] Nor can Divine Inspiration, by its outward Marks, be easily 
distinguish’d from it. For Inspiration is a real feeling of the Divine 
Presence, and Enthusiasm a false one.” 
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But how can one distinguish between ‘real’ and ‘false’ enthusiasm, if the virtue and 
power of enthusiasm is, according to Shaftesbury, the power to evoke enthusiasm 
in other people? Besides the “spontaneous” enthusiasm, “there is a sort of 
Enthusiasm of second hand”, Shaftesbury writes. Only by this enthusiasm “of 
second hand”, a mass enthusiasm becomes possible. This is what renders 
enthusiasm a political threat.  
 If the possibility of imitation of enthusiasm is exactly the condition of its 
own potential and power, then it is necessarily impossible to distinguish between 
the “real” and “false” feelings of a divine presence. The distinction proves to be as 
necessary as it is impossible. Shaftesbury writes about his distinction:  
 
“But the Passion they raise is much alike. For when the Mind is taken up in 
Vision, and fixes its viewer either on any real Object, or mere Specter of 
Divinity; when it sees, or thinks it sees any thing prodigious, and more than 
human; its Horrour, Delight, Confusion, Fear, Admiration, or whatever 
Passion belongs to it [...] will have something vast, immane, and (as Painters 
say) beyond Life. And this is what gave occasion to the name of Fanaticism, as 
it was us’d by the Antients in its original Sense, for an Apparition 
transporting the Mind.” 
 
Enthusiasm “transports” the mind, it moves it, carries it along, transmits it. Thus, 
enthusiasm is – in its ‘false’ form as well as in its ‘true’ form – a transmissive 
power, which moves the mind and can be understood as a significant means of 
communication. In the 18th century, enthusiasm was repeatedly criticized for its 
“unsociability”, but for Shaftesbury, it was the principal foundation of social 
behavior. Shaftesbury writes:  
 
“So that Inspiration may be justly call’d Divine ENTHUSIASM: For the Word 
it self signifies Divine Presence, and was made use of by the Philosopher 
whom the earliest Christian Fathers call’d Divine, to express whatever was 
sublime in human Passions. This was the spirit he allotted to Heroes, 
Statesmen, Poets, Orators, Musicians, and even Philosophers themselves. Nor can 
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we, of our own accord, forbear ascribing to a noble Enthusiasm, whatever 
is greatly perform’d by any of These.” 
 
By ascribing all the great works of all Heroes, Statesmen, Poets, and Artists to a 
“sensible madness”, Shaftesbury cites a traditional topos regarding the fine line 
separating a genius from a madman. Although he is greatly concerned with artificial 
enthusiasm, Shaftesbury insists on a genuine divine presence. Only this presence, 
holds Shaftesbury, can drive people to perform great thoughts and works.  
 
 
II.  
 
Kant’s interest in enthusiasm is evident in all his work. Already in the early “Essay 
on the Sickness of the Head” (1764), Kant began to speak of enthusiasm. Kant 
writes: “He who becomes more heated through a moral sentiment as a principle – 
more than others thought possible”, is called a “Phantast”. This “ambigous 
appearance of phantasy”, Kant writes, “is enthusiasm, and nothing great in the 
world has been done without it.” This sentence virtually quotes verbatim 
Shaftesbury’s assertion, it is only enthusiasm that evokes, “whatever is greatly 
perform’d”. 
 In Kant’s texts, the difficulty of enthusiasm’s ambiguity – which worried 
Shaftesbury – seems to be alleviated. Kant attempts to solve the problem by 
distinguishing between Enthusiasmus and Schwärmerei. This is a quite original 
distinction. Both words were synonymic in 18th century German, and Schwärmerei 
is the common translation to German of the english term enthusiasm. For Kant 
however, the words are opposites. As opposites, the dichotomous features of 
enthusiasm discussed by Shaftesbury can be recognized in Kant’s argument.  
 Schwärmerei is, as Kant describes, a dangerous political madness. The 
“fanatic”, Kant writes,  
 
“is actually a lunatic with a supposed unmediated inspiration and great 
intimacy with the powers of heaven. Human nature knows no more 
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dangerous delusion. If the eruption is fresh; if the betrayed man is talented; 
and if the crowd is well prepared to absorb the force of fermentation 
[Gärungsmittel], even a whole nation can suffer ecstasy.” 
 
The Schwärmer hears the voice of God. Through this supposed unmediated 
experience, he becomes one with God’s voice. Whereas the Schwärmer confuses his 
own subjectivity with that of the divine presence, the enthusiast, Kant clarifies, 
acts under the influence of a “moral sentiment”.  
 While Shaftesbury suggests the disparity between dangerous “enthusiasm” 
and good “inspiration” is the same as between real and false inspiration, Kant 
discerns two different sources of inspiration. The Schwärmer reacts on a feeling (of a 
supposed unmediated sensuous experience), but the enthusiast reacts on a moral 
principle. Kant draws this distinction explicitly in a footnote to his essay Observations 
on the feelings of Beauty and the Sublime. In his later essay, “Raising the Tone of 
Philosophy”, Kant accordingly discriminates between hearing a “voice of emotion” 
and the “voice of reason”.  
 But can this distinction truly be successful? Kant claims that enthusiasm 
can come into being “without the imagination of a supranatural community”. The 
enthusiast is, nevertheless, influenced by his imagination. In fact, enthusiasm can 
be compared to the state of a completely uninhibited and unrestrained 
imagination. In the Critique of Judgment, Kant defines enthusiasm as an “Idea of 
Good with a heightened state of emotion”. This state of emotion, of course, has 
to be activated by the imagination. Kant writes: “In enthusiasm, as an affection, 
the imagination is unbridled.” It thus follows that the “unbridledness” of the 
imagination, within the context of the sublime, does not come from a power to 
perceive the ideal and intangible in a sensuous way (like in the Schwärmerei). 
Instead, it recedes from any representation. It therefore points to the un-
representable, to ideal entities, such as the “Idea” of the “Good”.  
 For Kant, enthusiasm is a paradox. It is a state of mind, which is defined 
by the imagination going beyond its limits. The imagination convinces the mind of 
an Idea that cannot take on any physical, sensuous shape. However, it is precisely 
this loss that incites the imagination to become the medium of reason itself.  
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 While enthusiasm for Shaftesbury represents a “sensible kind of Madness”, 
it becomes for Kant the madness of reason. It is a madness caused by reason itself. In 
his Critique of Judgment, Kant observes that enthusiasm and Schwärmerei overlap: 
enthusiasm always borders on being a Sickness of the head, on being pure madness. 
 Like the Schwärmerei, enthusiasm is a deviation from “common sense”. In 
the state of exaltation, while surrendered to the Idea of Good by an unbridled 
imagination, the enthusiast resembles the madman. Neither Schwärmerei nor 
enthusiasm heeds the rational structures of the mind. Enthusiasm transverses all 
borders of finiteness. It ends up at the infinity of reason.  
 A confusion concerning the similarity between Schwärmerei and enthusiasm 
remains. Both phenomena are caused by the imagination transcending all borders 
of sensuousness, leaving behind any need for physicality. Schwärmerei is hearing 
“voices of emotion.” Enthusiasm is hearing the “voice of reason.” Knowing how 
rigorous Kant’s philosophy is, how can he allow himself to tell the difference 
between the two? 
 Kant tries to solve this problem by introducing the distinction between 
“positive” and “negative” representations. Positive representation is just the 
normal sensuous experience, but a visual experience of ideas can, according to 
Kant, only be a “dreaming according to principles (rational raving).” The 
representation of the enthusiastic rapture, however, doesn’t imagine a visual shape 
of the ideal object, it is a merely “negative” representation. A “negative 
representation” does not represent an object. Instead, it is a symbol of the 
unattainability of the object.  
 Enthusiasm’s paradox, then, is that “negative” representation represents an 
object, which can never be represented. Kant mentions an example out of the “Jewish 
Law” (the hebrew bible). It reads: “Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven 
image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven or on earth, or under the 
earth, etc.” “Negative” representation negates itself and is further constrained by 
self-contradiction. In his enthusiasm, he seems to have forgotten that he already 
said that. And so, few pages later, he writes: “Perhaps there has never been a more 
sublime utterance, or a thought more sublimely expressed, than the well-known 
inscription upon the Temple of Isis (Mother Nature): ‘I am all that is, and that 
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was, and that shall be, and no mortal hath raised the veil from before my face’.” 
The “I” does not present itself, and cannot be seen or understood in any way. 
“Negative representation” is constrained to self-negation and self-contradiction. 
The “voice of reason” is thus necessarily a silent voice: the only thing it can utter is 
its own muteness. Every enthusiastic moment of rapture must both obey and 
perpetrate the rule of “negative” representation. The border between enthusiasm 
and Schwärmerei remains blurred.  	  
